---
title: "Cursor: a key its vendor exposed led to a fake Claude Code extension for up to 5,000 users"
summary: "Cursor’s update of 13 November: how a key it gave Fireworks AI led, through stolen traces and credentials, to a fake extension served for 11 hours, and what to check."
url: https://www.thetechbag.com/blog/cursor-fireworks-key-fake-claude-code-extension-5000-users
format: Note
desk: "Security"
area: "Threats & vulnerabilities"
region: Global
published: 2026-11-16
facts_checked: 2026-11-16
author: TechBag (The TechBag Journal)
tags: ["Cursor security incident","Cursor breach","Claude Code extension malware","Fireworks AI breach","Cursor","Fireworks AI","Claude Code 2.1.312","VS Code extension marketplace","Open VSX","malicious extension","SSH backdoor","coding agent traces","Privacy Mode","credential rotation","supply chain attack"]
cover: https://www.thetechbag.com/blog/covers/cursor-fireworks-key-fake-claude-code-extension-5000-users.png
---

# Cursor: a key its vendor exposed led to a fake Claude Code extension for up to 5,000 users

*Cursor’s update of 13 November: how a key it gave Fireworks AI led, through stolen traces and credentials, to a fake extension served for 11 hours, and what to check.*

Note · Security · Threats & vulnerabilities · By TechBag · Published 2026-11-16 · Facts checked 2026-11-16 · Canonical: https://www.thetechbag.com/blog/cursor-fireworks-key-fake-claude-code-extension-5000-users

A malicious copy of the Claude Code extension, versions 2.1.312 and 2.1.313, sat on the cache that serves Cursor’s VS Code extension marketplace for about 11 hours on 29 October, and at most 5,000 users who requested those versions that day may have received it. Cursor’s update of 13 November traces it to an access key Cursor had issued to its model vendor, Fireworks AI, which “was exposed by Fireworks”.[1] Anthropic, which publishes the genuine extension, did not publish the copy, and Cursor says this was not a vulnerability in Anthropic’s product; Open VSX, the marketplace’s source, never had the malware.[1]

~11h

the fake extension was available, 2:27am to 1:35pm PT on 29 October

Cursor

5,000

users at most who may have received it

Cursor

0.05%

of users, at most, had coding-agent traces exposed

Cursor

0.01%

of customers, at most, had API credentials exposed

Cursor

## Four steps from a vendor’s key to a user’s laptop

Cursor shared data with Fireworks through a read-only storage bucket. It held coding-agent traces, the records of agent sessions, mostly from 2025 and only from sessions not in Privacy Mode, which Cursor was permitted to use for model training. The attacker used the key to copy them. A few traces held credentials that had not been redacted, and with those the attacker reached some of the SaaS tools Cursor uses: archived non-production code, limited support emails, usage metrics and contacts, and some credentials users had sent to Cursor’s support team. A credential found there opened the marketplace cache.[1]

**Figure: A key Cursor gave its model vendor ended, four steps later, in a backdoored extension**

*The chain of access in Cursor's incident, as Cursor describes it, October to 1 November 2026*

1. 01Key exposed at FireworksAn access key Cursor issued to Fireworks AI opens a read-only bucket of coding-agent traces.
2. 02Credentials in tracesUnredacted credentials in a few traces lead into SaaS tools Cursor uses, and to more credentials.
3. 03Cache alteredOn 29 October a stolen credential places Claude Code 2.1.312 and 2.1.313 copies on the marketplace cache.
4. 04Backdoor attemptedFor about 11 hours, up to 5,000 users may get a build that adds an SSH key and tries to open a tunnel.

Source: Cursor, security notice of 29 October and update of 13 November 2026 · as of 16 November 2026, 11:30pm IST

The copy sent host and user details to the attacker, added the attacker’s SSH key to the user’s authorised keys, installed a task to keep a reverse SSH tunnel running, and tried to switch on the computer’s SSH service. On most macOS and Windows machines that last step needs administrator rights the extension did not have, so it failed and the attacker could not log in through the tunnel. Cursor worked with the hosting provider to take the attacker’s server offline.[2]

## What it did not reach, and what changed

Cursor says the attacker did not reach Privacy Mode prompts and code, live traffic, production systems, customer code repositories, any other extension, or the Cursor app and its updates, which ship from a separate code host; no release signing keys were exposed. The last attacker activity it saw, on 1 November, was blocked. It has moved all inference off Fireworks, rotated every credential in use across its internal systems, and added secret scanning to its code and other internal data.[1]

Fireworks’ own bulletins do not name Cursor. It found unauthorised use of internal credentials on 6 October, with secrets stored in customers’ evaluation jobs captured; by 9 November it had also found account and billing data, and for some accounts datasets and incomplete models, accessed.[3][4] Fireworks also appears in [our Note on Railway’s US$740,000 of stolen AI keys](https://www.thetechbag.com/blog/railway-740000-ai-bill-stolen-keys).

## What to check

Cursor’s steps apply to anyone who installed or updated to 2.1.312 or 2.1.313 from its marketplace on macOS or Windows in the window (09:27 to 20:35 UTC on 29 October; 2:57pm to 2:05am the next day in IST). Look for an SSH key labelled `svc-telemetry` in the authorised-keys file; if it is there, isolate the machine, run Cursor’s clean-up script, remove the key, the persistence tasks and any tunnel process, and rotate every credential reachable from it, from a different machine. Uninstalling the extension may not be enough: the payload leaves scripts that keep running.[2] Team admins whose keys were exposed were sent a list to rotate.[1]

Our viewA key pasted into an agent is a key on record

Credentials typed into a coding agent can end up in its traces, and traces get shared. Rotate any key that has passed through a session; the same lesson runs through [the hijacked GitHub accounts that stole CI secrets](https://www.thetechbag.com/blog/github-4837-hijacked-accounts-61764-repos-ci-secrets).

How we did this

Figures as of 16 November 2026, 11:30pm IST

The chain, the 5,000, the 11 hours and the two percentages are Cursor’s figures in its update of 13 November; the percentages are upper bounds (“fewer than”, “less than”). The window and the payload are from its notice of 29 October, given in Pacific Daylight Time (UTC-7); the UTC and IST times are our conversion, and the window runs 11 hours 8 minutes. Fireworks’ dates and findings are from its two bulletins. Cursor does not say when the key was exposed, and we do not link it to a Fireworks date. Neither company names the attacker, and nor do we.

Spotted an error? Write to us; corrections are published at the foot of the piece.

Sources

1. [Cursor: An update on our recent security incident](https://cursor.com/blog/security-incident-update) — 13 November 2026
2. [Cursor: Security notice: malicious version of Anthropic.claude-code (2.1.312 and 2.1.313) identified in the Cursor VS Code Extension Marketplace](https://cursor.com/blog/claude-code-extension-security-notice) — 29 October 2026, updated 30 October 11:30am PT
3. [Fireworks AI: Fireworks October 2026 security incident (security bulletin)](https://fireworks.ai/security/bulletins/october-2026-security-incident) — 9 October 2026, last updated 10 October
4. [Fireworks AI: Update on October 2026 security incident](https://fireworks.ai/security/bulletins/october-2026-security-incident-update) — 9 November 2026

**Disclosure.** TechBag is a software reseller: it earns when companies buy through it, including from vendors named here. The analysis is TechBag’s own; no vendor paid for or saw this piece before publication. Facts are labelled reported, TechBag count or our view.

**Read this next:** [Third parties were in 48% of breaches; 1 of 5 TPRM pricing pages shows a price](https://www.thetechbag.com/blog/third-party-risk-management-security-ratings-must) — When a supplier is the way in: third parties were in 48% of breaches, and only 1 of 5 TPRM vendors’ pricing pages shows a price.

Go deeper on TechBag

- [Railway: attackers ran up US$740,000 on its customers’ stolen AI keys](https://www.thetechbag.com/blog/railway-740000-ai-bill-stolen-keys) — another company caught in the same month’s AI-key thefts, with Fireworks AI’s own disclosure
- [4,837 hijacked GitHub accounts probed 61,764 repos; at least 1,806 ran a secret stealer](https://www.thetechbag.com/blog/github-4837-hijacked-accounts-61764-repos-ci-secrets) — stolen developer logins turned into stolen CI secrets
- [HashiCorp Vault](https://www.thetechbag.com/hashicorp/hashicorp-vault) — short-lived credentials, so a key in a log or trace expires on its own
