---
title: "FAA ground stop: router work at one remote site destabilised 17 of 22 centres"
summary: "The FAA’s account of 13 November: a data flood on its telecom network, 17 of 22 en-route centres unstable, a 4-hour 25-minute nationwide stop and about 12,462 cancellations that day."
url: https://www.thetechbag.com/blog/faa-ground-stop-router-17-of-22-centres-12462-cancellations
format: Analysis
desk: "Cloud & DevOps"
region: Global
published: 2026-11-17
facts_checked: 2026-11-17
author: TechBag (The TechBag Journal)
tags: ["FAA ground stop","FAA outage","nationwide ground stop","air traffic control outage","L3Harris","FAA Telecommunications Infrastructure","FTI network","TDM to IP migration","ARTCC","TRACON","El Dorado Arkansas","Amarillo radar site","flight cancellations","Chase outage","United Airlines outage","Microsoft 365 outage","change management"]
cover: https://www.thetechbag.com/blog/covers/faa-ground-stop-router-17-of-22-centres-12462-cancellations.png
---

# FAA ground stop: router work at one remote site destabilised 17 of 22 centres

*The FAA’s account of 13 November: a data flood on its telecom network, 17 of 22 en-route centres unstable, a 4-hour 25-minute nationwide stop and about 12,462 cancellations that day.*

Analysis · Cloud & DevOps · By TechBag · Published 2026-11-17 · Facts checked 2026-11-17 · Canonical: https://www.thetechbag.com/blog/faa-ground-stop-router-17-of-22-centres-12462-cancellations

The short version

1. On 13 November data flooded the FAA’s telecommunications network at “1,000 connection attempts every 4 to 5 seconds”, and its legacy equipment became unstable at 17 of its 22 en-route centres. The FAA held every departure in the US for about four hours and 25 minutes; all of the roughly 3,500 aircraft then in the air landed safely.[1][2][3]
2. The FAA traces the flood to two remote sites, a radar site in Amarillo, Texas, and a radio site in El Dorado, Arkansas, where its network contractor L3Harris had been installing a new router. L3Harris blocked both sites, and the FAA disabled the same router function on more than 60 similar routers. It says there is no indication of a cyberattack.[1]
3. The FAA blames its old time-division (TDM) equipment, not the move to fibre, which L3Harris says is more than 70% done. Operators cancelled about 12,462 flights that day, though the FAA says not all were caused by the stop.[1][4]

A ground stop of the whole United States began with routine work at a remote site. Anyone who runs a network, an airline schedule or a payments system will want to know how one router job travelled that far, why the FAA points at its oldest equipment rather than its newest, and what was changed afterwards. We read the FAA’s answers, its command centre’s advisories, L3Harris’s statement and the FAA’s own paper on its network, and set the week’s other outages beside it, each with the cause its owner gave.

## Four hours and 25 minutes with every departure held

The FAA says that “on November 13 at approximately 3:30 p.m. ET, the FAA experienced a technical problem that resulted in issuing a nationwide ground stop.”[1] Its Air Traffic Control System Command Center put the order out as advisory 111, signed at 20:54 UTC (3:54pm ET; 2:24am on 14 November in India): “by order of the Federal Aviation Command Center all airports are ground stopped. All departing traffic should remain ground stopped until further notice. Inbound international flights will be managed on a case by case basis.”[2] The FAA’s glossary describes a ground stop as a process that “requires aircraft that meet a specific criteria to remain on the ground”, normally tied to one airport, one stretch of airspace or one type of aircraft; here the criterion was every airport.[8]

The FAA says the system was stable and air traffic resumed “as of 8:15 p.m. that same day”.[1] Advisory 005, signed at 01:19 UTC on 14 November (8:19pm ET; 6:49am IST), reads: “The FAA Command Center nationwide ground stop has been cancelled.”[3] United Airlines said at 8:10pm Central time that it was resuming operations.[9]

**Figure: The nationwide stop ran from 20:54 to 01:19 UTC: an afternoon in the US, the small hours in India**

*FAA nationwide ground stop of 13–14 November 2026, in UTC, with Eastern and India times in each detail*

| Date | Event | Detail |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 13 Nov, 20:30 UTC | Instability begins | FAA: about 3:30pm ET; 2:00am IST, 14 Nov |
| 13 Nov, 20:54 UTC | Advisory 111: all airports stopped | 3:54pm ET; 2:24am IST |
| 13 Nov, 21:30 UTC | United holds new domestic departures | Statement at 3:30pm CT (4:30pm ET); 3:00am IST |
| 14 Nov, 01:15 UTC | Traffic resumes | FAA: 8:15pm ET; 6:45am IST |
| 14 Nov, 01:19 UTC | Advisory 005: stop cancelled | 8:19pm ET; 6:49am IST |
| 14 Nov, 02:10 UTC | United resumes operations | Statement at 8:10pm CT (9:10pm ET); 7:40am IST |

Source: FAA Q&A (15 November); ATCSCC advisories 111 and 005; United Airlines statements · as of 17 November 2026, 10:30pm IST · The 20:30 and 01:15 UTC times are the FAA's 'approximately 3:30 p.m.' and '8:15 p.m.' ET

TechBag countHow we timed the stop

From the signature on advisory 111 (20:54 UTC) to the signature on advisory 005 (01:19 UTC) is four hours and 25 minutes. The “event times” printed in the two advisories, 20:53 and 01:16 UTC, give four hours and 23 minutes. From the FAA’s “approximately 3:30 p.m.” start of the problem to its 8:15pm resumption is about four hours and 45 minutes.[1][2][3]

## How one router job reached 17 of 22 centres

The network that failed is the FAA Telecommunications Infrastructure, FTI, which L3Harris operates for the FAA. L3Harris says FTI “securely connects more than 4,400 facilities, manages more than 29,000 services, and supports the safe operation of 45,000 daily flights”, and that “every clearance delivered to a pilot, every radar return displayed to a controller” flows through it.[5][6] The FAA calls L3Harris “the FAA’s current network service provider”.[1]

The FAA’s account of the failure is short. “The FAA’s legacy equipment became unstable when data began flooding the FAA FTI network, at a rate of 1,000 connection attempts every 4 to 5 seconds. This disrupted the system and created instability with aircraft communications and radar feeds.” The initial investigation points to “two potential locations”: a radar site in Amarillo, Texas, and a radio communications site in El Dorado, Arkansas. “L3 Harris … had been doing work at the El Dorado site, including deployment of a new router.” When the inconsistencies appeared, L3Harris blocked both locations “and the network stabilized”.[1]

**Figure: A flood from two remote sites unsettled the shared network until both were cut off**

*The FAA's account of the 13 November 2026 failure on its FTI telecommunications network, in four steps*

1. 01Router work at a remote siteL3Harris deploys a new router at a radio site in El Dorado, Arkansas, during the day. A radar site in Amarillo, Texas, is the second suspected source.
2. 02A flood on the shared networkData floods FTI at “1,000 connection attempts every 4 to 5 seconds”.
3. 03Legacy equipment wobblesRadio and radar feeds turn unstable at 17 of 22 en-route centres, then at several TRACONs; some frequencies and feeds keep working.
4. 04Block, disable, waitBoth sites are blocked; the router function is disabled on more than 60 similar routers; the stop lifts once the network has held.

Source: FAA, Nationwide Ground Stop: Questions and Answers · as of 15 November 2026 · Initial findings; the FAA and L3Harris are still investigating the root cause

The FAA has not described the flood beyond its rate. It says “the broadcasting function was also disabled on all the new routers as a precaution”, and later that “we disabled the same functionality on more than 60 similar routers in the system.”[1] In networking, a broadcast is a message a device sends to every other device on its segment. The FAA has not said what the routers were broadcasting, or why the El Dorado installation began to.

On timing, the FAA’s answer is direct: “Maintenance at major air traffic control facilities is typically conducted at night, when there’s less traffic. This disruption was a result of a routine replacement at a remote facility, which has regularly been done for decades, without any impacts to the systems at these times.” It adds: “based on what happened Friday, we will reevaluate when we do replacement/maintenance work.”[1] L3Harris’s own description of its method is a “build-then-switch” approach, “cutting over during carefully coordinated low-traffic periods with full backup systems in place”.[6]

## Seventeen centres, 3,500 aircraft and 12,462 cancellations

“We began experiencing instability at 17 of our 22 Air Route Traffic Control Centers, and it spread into several Terminal Radar Approach Controls,” the FAA says.[1] The two are different layers of the same system. In the FAA’s glossary, an Air Route Traffic Control Center is “a facility established to provide air traffic control service to aircraft operating on IFR flight plans within controlled airspace and principally during the en route phase of flight”: the cruise between airports. A radar approach control facility, the TRACON, is “a terminal ATC facility that uses radar and nonradar capabilities to provide approach control services to aircraft arriving, departing, or transiting” the airspace around an airport.[8] The instability reached most of the cruise layer and part of the layer that brings aircraft down.

**Figure: Instability reached 17 of 22 centres; every aircraft in the air landed safely**

*The FAA's figures for the 13 November 2026 nationwide ground stop*

17 of 22

en-route centres (ARTCCs) with unstable radio and radar feeds

FAA

~3,500

aircraft in the air when the stop began; all landed safely

FAA

~12,462

flights cancelled by operators on 13 November, 9,082 of them by major airlines

FAA

60+

similar routers with the same function disabled

FAA

Source: FAA, Nationwide Ground Stop: Questions and Answers · as of 15 November 2026 · Cancellations are all operators' cancellations that day; the FAA says not all were caused by the stop

It was not a blackout. “No, this was not a full outage. Some frequencies and radar feeds remained reliable,” the FAA says, and “frequencies remained available to safely land commercial aircraft” while life-saving, law-enforcement and military flights went on. “Approximately 3,500 aircraft safely landed, and every passenger arrived safely.”[1] On cancellations the FAA’s wording is careful, and we quote it in full: “operators canceled approximately 12,462 flights, including 9,082 cancellations by major airlines, out of an abundance of caution. While not all cancellations were directly caused by the nationwide ground stop, all flights landed safely.”[1]

On the cause, the FAA is equally plain: “Based on all available evidence, we have no indication that this was a cyberattack or an outside nefarious actor.”[1] L3Harris says it is “supporting the FAA in its investigation to understand the conditions that led to the Nov. 13 ground stop”.[4] United’s chief executive, Scott Kirby, wrote on 15 November that the air traffic control system “needs more investment in modern technology to ensure better redundancy and reliability now.”[10]

## The FAA blames its legacy TDM equipment, not the move to fibre

Asked whether its upgrades caused the failure, the FAA says: “No, this is due to the legacy TDM system causing instabilities. None of the upgraded towers that received modifications from the down payment in the Working Families Tax Cuts went down.” It describes the work as years of moving “from old copper wires that are being disconnected due to their obsolescence”, and asks readers to “distinguish routine equipment upgrades from the FAA’s broader modernization effort.”[1]

TDM, time-division multiplexing, gives each connection a fixed, recurring slot on a circuit, the way telephone networks were built; IP networks send traffic as packets that can be routed around a fault. The FAA’s own FTI programme office set out how much of its operational network still runs the old way in a 2015 paper: “more than 90% of the 23,000+ services obtained under the FTI contract are TDM-based and support critical NAS services such as surveillance radar, air/ground voice, and interphone (ground/ground voice).” Carriers had said they would retire TDM services “as early as 2020”.[7]

**Figure: The FAA's own paper: TDM carried over 90% of FTI services; IP was the more flexible path**

*The two network types as the FAA's FTI programme office and L3Harris describe them, 2015 to November 2026*

TDM on copper: the legacy

- More than 90% of 23,000+ FTI services in 2015
- Carries surveillance radar, air/ground voice and interphone
- Required by the interfaces of the systems that plug into it
- The equipment the FAA says became unstable on 13 November

IP on fibre: the replacement

- “More cost-effective”, in the FAA’s 2015 words
- Can “dynamically route communications”, improving resiliency
- Fibre, satellite and wireless links, says L3Harris
- More than 70% of the conversion done by 14 November

Source: FAA FTI-2 Program Office, TDM-to-IP Migration (27 October 2015); L3Harris (11 May and 14 November 2026) · as of 17 November 2026 · The 90% share is the FAA's 2015 figure; no newer split has been published

The pace of the change is in L3Harris’s own updates. On 11 May it said it had completed 50% of the effort, was deploying 150 to 200 new network paths a month, and was “on track for completion in 2027”.[6] On 14 November it said that L3Harris, “together with its telco partners and the FAA, has completed more than 70% of the planned airspace communications conversion from legacy copper wires to a fiber optic system.”[4] Its FTI page claims “99.99971% network reliability by working during maintenance windows, deploying parallel systems and coordinating closely with FAA technical operations staff”; that is L3Harris’s figure, and it does not say over what period.[5] The failure came mid-conversion: the FAA names a newly installed router as one likely source, and its legacy equipment as what became unstable.

Our viewTwo checks any network team can take from the FAA's answers

First, a change at a small, remote site is still a change to the whole network if that site can send traffic everywhere; the FAA’s fix was to cut two sites off and turn one function off on more than 60 routers. Second, night-time work was the practice at major facilities, while the remote-site replacement was done in the middle of the day, as such work had been for decades; the FAA now says it will reconsider. Both are questions to put to any carrier or managed-network provider: which sites can reach everything, and when are they allowed to be changed.[1]

## The same week: three more outages, three more stated causes

Three other services that Americans use every day failed between 12 and 16 November. Each company gave its own account of the cause, and none of them connects its failure to any other. We set them side by side because they fell in the same five days; nothing in any of the statements says they were linked. Earlier in the month, a fault in [AWS’s Tokyo region ran 5 hours 45 minutes](https://www.thetechbag.com/blog/aws-tokyo-zone-5-hours-failed-launches), and [Google Cloud’s 6-hour London outage](https://www.thetechbag.com/blog/google-cloud-london-6-hours-generators-no-signal) began with generators that got no start signal.

ReportedThe week's other US outages, each in its owner's words

**Microsoft 365, 12 to 14 November.** Microsoft’s preliminary report says a fix it began deploying in July to its networking gateway servers carried a latent defect, lock contention on many-core machines. A Teams failover and nearly 14% of capacity already out set it off during US peak traffic, and more than 80% of the gateway’s servers became unresponsive. Service was restored to the remaining customers at 06:09 UTC on 14 November.[11][12] Our Note has the detail: [the outage began with a July fix](https://www.thetechbag.com/blog/microsoft-365-outage-cause-july-fix-80-percent-gateways).

**JPMorgan Chase, 16 November.** At 20:57 UTC (3:57pm ET; 2:27am IST on 17 November) Chase posted on X: “JPMorganChase has experienced a temporary issue related to a software bug in on-premise hardware systems – there is no evidence this is cyber-related.” It added: “Where we were party to a transaction involving other banks, those banks may have been impacted, but this is not a systemic issue. Customers still have access to their accounts and funds.”[13] It said it was working to resolve the issue “by the end of the day today”, and a spokesperson gave CNBC the same account.[14]

**United Airlines, 16 November.** United posted at 23:13 UTC (6:13pm ET) that “earlier today we experienced a technology-related issue that impacted some departing flights. The issue has been resolved.”[15] It has not named a cause. AeroTime, citing a memo from the pilots’ union, reported that several pilot applications went down and that pilots could not get the final aircraft weights used to calculate take-off performance, and that United put the fix at about 6pm Eastern.[16] United told Fox News Digital there was “no impact on flights in progress, or on United Express flights” and “no indication that this was a cybersecurity-related issue”.[17]

**Figure: Four outages in five days, four different stated causes, and none claimed as an attack**

*Outages felt in the US, 12 to 16 November 2026: what failed, when, and the cause as its owner stated it*

Open the table for the four outages, side by side:

| Outage | When (UTC) | Cause, as stated | Cyberattack? |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| FAA telecom network (FTI): nationwide ground stop | 13 Nov, stop 20:54 to 01:19 (14 Nov) | Data flood from two remote sites, one with a new router; legacy TDM equipment unstable | FAA: no indication |
| Microsoft 365 networking gateway (Exchange Online hit hardest) | 12 Nov to 14 Nov 06:09 | Latent defect in a fix deployed from July: lock contention, set off by a failover and missing capacity | Not addressed in the abridged report |
| JPMorgan Chase transactions | 16 Nov; statement 20:57 | A software bug in on-premise hardware systems | Chase: no evidence |
| United Airlines departures | 16 Nov; resolved about 23:00 | Not stated by United; reported loss of pilots' final weight data | United: no indication |

Source: FAA; Microsoft; JPMorganChase; United Airlines; AeroTime (dates in Sources) · as of 17 November 2026, 10:30pm IST · United has not stated a cause; the weight-data detail is reported, not United's statement

In India: the stop ran 2:24am to 6:49am, and the RBI already asks for a way back from a failed change

In Indian time the ground stop ran from 2:24am to 6:49am on Saturday 14 November. Advisory 111 left inbound international flights, India’s among them, to be “managed on a case by case basis”; it did not stop them outright.[2] The FAA published no figures for international flights, and we found none for India.

For an Indian bank or NBFC the lesson of the week is already a written rule. The RBI’s Master Direction on IT governance of 7 November 2023, in force since 1 April 2024, requires documented change and patch management so that “the business impact of implementing patches/ changes … are assessed” and a “mechanism is established to recover from failed changes/ patch deployment or unexpected results.”[18] A router job at a branch or a remote data link is such a change. The question the FAA is now asking itself, which sites may be changed during working hours, is worth asking of every network provider before the next window.

How we did this

Figures as of 17 November 2026, 10:30pm IST

The cause, sites, flood rate, centres, aircraft, routers and cancellations are the FAA’s, from its answers of 15 November, with its caveat on cancellations. Times are from ATCSCC advisories 111 and 005; the four hours and 25 minutes is our arithmetic from their signature times. Eastern time is UTC minus five hours (US daylight saving ended on 1 November); India time is UTC plus five and a half. FTI’s scale and the conversion progress are L3Harris’s figures; the TDM share is the FAA’s 2015 figure, the newest it has published. The FAA’s findings are initial. The other outages are in their owners’ words (Chase’s post read in full through X’s syndication service); United’s weight-data detail is reported, not stated by United. User-reported outage counts are not used, and we claim no link between the outages.

Spotted an error? Write to us; corrections are published at the foot of the piece.

Sources

1. [FAA: Nationwide Ground Stop: Questions and Answers](https://www.faa.gov/newsroom/nationwide-ground-stop-questions-and-answers) — 15 November 2026
2. [FAA ATCSCC Advisory 111: National Ground Stop](https://www.fly.faa.gov/adv/adv_otherdis?advn=111&amp;adv_date=11132026&amp;facId=DCC&amp;title=NATIONAL%20GROUND%20STOP&amp;titleDate=11/13/2026) — 13 November 2026, signed 20:54 UTC
3. [FAA ATCSCC Advisory 005: CNX Nationwide Ground Stop](https://www.fly.faa.gov/adv/adv_otherdis?advn=005&amp;adv_date=11142026&amp;facId=DCC&amp;title=CNX%20NATIONWIDE%20GROUND%20STOP&amp;titleDate=11/14/2026) — 14 November 2026, signed 01:19 UTC
4. [L3Harris: Statement on the Nov. 13 Ground Stop](https://www.l3harris.com/newsroom/press-release/2026/11/l3harris-statement-nov-13-ground-stop) — 14 November 2026
5. [L3Harris: FAA Telecommunications Infrastructure (FTI)](https://www.l3harris.com/all-capabilities/faa-telecommunications-infrastructure-fti) — progress tracker last updated 2 November 2026
6. [L3Harris: L3Harris Reaches Over 50% in FAA Telecommunications Modernization](https://www.l3harris.com/newsroom/editorial/2026/05/l3harris-reaches-over-50-faa-telecommunications-modernization) — 11 May 2026
7. [FAA, FTI-2 Program Office: TDM-to-IP Migration](https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/air_traffic/technology/cinp/fens/tdm-to-ip_migration_2015-10-27.pdf) — 27 October 2015
8. [FAA: Pilot/Controller Glossary (Air Route Traffic Control Center; Radar Approach Control Facility; Ground Stop)](https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/publications/atpubs/pcg_html/glossary-a.html) — edition in force, November 2026
9. [United Airlines: Statements on FAA's Nationwide Ground Stop](https://united.mediaroom.com/news-releases?item=125498) — 13 November 2026, updated 14 November 8:50am CT
10. [United Airlines: An Update on the FAA Nationwide Ground Stop from Scott Kirby](https://united.mediaroom.com/news-releases?item=125499) — 15 November 2026
11. [Charles Lamanna (Microsoft) on X: abridged preliminary post-incident report on the Microsoft 365 networking gateway outage](https://x.com/clamanna/status/2122209697226948729) — 16 November 2026, 06:06 UTC
12. [Microsoft 365 Status on X: service restored to the remaining impacted customers and regions](https://x.com/MSFT365Status/status/2121485746334777593) — 14 November 2026, 06:09 UTC
13. [JPMorganChase (@Chase) on X: statement on the transaction delays](https://x.com/Chase/status/2122433813955379268) — 16 November 2026, 20:57 UTC
14. [CNBC: JPMorgan Chase says temporary software bug is affecting consumer banking](https://www.cnbc.com/2026/11/16/jpmorgan-chase-technical-issue.html) — 16 November 2026
15. [United Airlines (@united) on X: technology-related issue resolved](https://x.com/united/status/2122468207202279437) — 16 November 2026, 23:13 UTC
16. [AeroTime: United outage delays departures as pilots lose access to aircraft weight data](https://www.aerotime.aero/articles/united-airlines-outage-flight-delays-aircraft-weight-data) — 17 November 2026, 00:58 UTC
17. [Fox Business: Details emerge about United Airlines outage that forced departure delays (United's statement; AP report)](https://www.foxbusiness.com/lifestyle/extremely-important-united-airlines-system-forced-90-minute-departure-delay) — 17 November 2026, 7:35am EST
18. [Reserve Bank of India: Master Direction on Information Technology Governance, Risk, Controls and Assurance Practices, paragraph 13](https://www.rbi.org.in/Scripts/BS_ViewMasDirections.aspx?id=12562) — 7 November 2023; in force from 1 April 2024

**Disclosure.** TechBag is a software reseller: it earns when companies buy through it, including from vendors named here. The analysis is TechBag’s own; no vendor paid for or saw this piece before publication. Facts are labelled reported, TechBag count or our view.

**Read this next:** [Microsoft 365 outage began with a July fix; over 80% of gateway servers went unresponsive](https://www.thetechbag.com/blog/microsoft-365-outage-cause-july-fix-80-percent-gateways) — The same week’s other outage cause: Microsoft 365’s began with a July fix, and over 80% of gateway servers went unresponsive.

Go deeper on TechBag

- [Observability and APM guide](https://www.thetechbag.com/browse/devops/observability-apm) — tools that alert on a flood of connection attempts before users notice
- [Disaster recovery guide](https://www.thetechbag.com/browse/backup-cyber-resilience/disaster-recovery) — failover plans for when a shared network or provider goes down
