---
title: "Trezor found hidden boards in 3 wallets and cut its reseller network by about 80%"
summary: "Trezor’s update of 12 November: a board between the screen and the main board that sent recovery words out by mobile network, the reseller behind it, and what changed."
url: https://www.thetechbag.com/blog/trezor-hidden-board-3-wallets-resellers-cut-80-percent
format: Note
desk: "Security"
area: "Endpoints & devices"
region: Global
published: 2026-11-16
facts_checked: 2026-11-16
author: TechBag (The TechBag Journal)
tags: ["Trezor implant","Trezor CryptoBilis","Trezor Safe 5 hack","hardware wallet supply chain attack","Trezor","CryptoBilis","Ledger implant","Trezor firmware 2.13.1","recovery phrase","seed phrase","hardware wallet","Tokopedia","Shopee","SEAL 911","supply chain attack","crypto wallet security"]
cover: https://www.thetechbag.com/blog/covers/trezor-hidden-board-3-wallets-resellers-cut-80-percent.png
---

# Trezor found hidden boards in 3 wallets and cut its reseller network by about 80%

*Trezor’s update of 12 November: a board between the screen and the main board that sent recovery words out by mobile network, the reseller behind it, and what changed.*

Note · Security · Endpoints & devices · By TechBag · Published 2026-11-16 · Facts checked 2026-11-16 · Canonical: https://www.thetechbag.com/blog/trezor-hidden-board-3-wallets-resellers-cut-80-percent

Trezor has found an extra circuit board, fitted between the main board and the screen, inside three of its Trezor Safe 5 hardware wallets. The board copied the recovery words shown on the screen and sent them out over a mobile network. All three wallets were bought from one reseller, CryptoBilis, between 20 August and 23 September.[1] In an update on 12 November, Trezor said it had cut its reseller network by about 80% and that firmware 2.13.1, released the day before, stops the implants it has found from capturing anything. No customer has reported losing funds, Trezor says.[1]

3

Trezor Safe 5 wallets found with the implant, all bought from CryptoBilis

Trezor

48

CryptoBilis buyers who came forward to have their devices checked

Trezor

~80%

of Trezor’s reseller network cut, under stricter rules for the rest

Trezor

2.13.1

firmware, released 11 November, that blinds the implants found

Trezor

## What the hidden board did

A hardware wallet keeps the keys to someone’s cryptocurrency on a small offline device. Its recovery words, 20 on a Trezor Safe 5’s backup cards, are the master copy of those keys: whoever holds them can rebuild the wallet on any device and move the funds.[4] Trezor’s engineers extracted the firmware from the implant in the first reported device. The board only listens. It copies everything the screen shows, including what the owner types on the device, and stores the recovery words whenever they appear: when the device creates a new backup, and when the owner types an existing backup in to recover a wallet. It does the same with a passphrase. It encrypts what it captures and sends it to a server run by the attackers over the mobile network, retrying until it connects. It changes nothing on the device itself, neither the firmware nor the Secure Element chip.[1]

CryptoBilis was, until October, an official Trezor reseller in Southeast Asia. The first device was reported on 28 October by a customer in Indonesia who had bought it through CryptoBilis’s store on Tokopedia; the three confirmed ones came through its Tokopedia and Shopee stores and from CryptoBilis directly. Trezor’s lab examined the first; the other two were identified from photos their owners sent. Every other device checked, including ones from Trezor’s other resellers in the region, showed no sign of tampering.[1][2]

Trezor says the implant works the same way as those found in Ledger wallets. Ledger said on 15 October that “a highly organized criminal group” had spent many months buying genuine Ledger devices, fitting hidden components to capture the recovery phrase during setup, and putting them back on sale through resellers in South East Asia; there was no flaw in Ledger’s chip, operating system or servers.[3] CryptoBilis sold both brands, and Trezor removed it on 9 October, the day Ledger began investigating fund losses among its customers.[2]

**Figure: Trezor confirmed 3 implanted wallets 7 weeks after the last was sold**

*Purchases, disclosures and fixes in Trezor’s and Ledger’s own statements, 20 August to 12 November 2026*

| Date | Event | Detail |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 20 Aug 2026 | First implanted wallet bought | Earliest of the three confirmed purchases from CryptoBilis |
| 23 Sept 2026 | Last implanted wallet bought | Bought via Tokopedia, Shopee or CryptoBilis directly |
| 9 Oct 2026 | Trezor drops CryptoBilis | The day Ledger began investigating losses among its buyers |
| 15 Oct 2026 | Ledger’s statement | Implants fitted to genuine devices resold in South East Asia |
| 28 Oct 2026 | Implant reported to Trezor | A Safe 5 bought in August, reported from Indonesia |
| 30 Oct 2026 | Trezor warns buyers | Move funds to a new wallet with a new seed |
| 11 Nov 2026 | Firmware 2.13.1 | Stops the implants found from capturing anything |
| 12 Nov 2026 | 3 confirmed; resellers cut 80% | 48 CryptoBilis buyers had come forward |

Source: Trezor, updates of 30 October and 12 November 2026; Ledger, 15 October 2026 · as of 12 November 2026

## What changed, and what a buyer can check

The firmware fix does not rescue a backup the implant has already sent. Anyone who bought a Trezor from CryptoBilis from March 2026 onwards should move their funds to a new wallet with a new seed, and is offered a replacement device or a refund.[1] The resellers Trezor dropped were, in its words, “trustworthy and posed no immediate threat” but did not fit stricter rules on how devices are sourced, stored and who can touch them.[1] Ledger has told its resellers to keep stock off shelves and hand it over only at the moment of sale, and never to resell a returned device.[3]

ReportedWhat the checks can and cannot show

Trezor’s setup guide asks buyers to check that the holographic seal over the USB-C port is intact and the backup cards are blank; the device ships without firmware, and Trezor Suite runs a Secure Element check that the device is genuine.[4] By Trezor’s own account, the implant touches neither the firmware nor the Secure Element. Trezor also says there is no dependable way to inspect a device yourself and that weighing it is not a reliable test. Its advice is to buy directly from trezor.io.[1][2]

Trezor is working with SEAL 911, the Security Alliance’s emergency response service, and says it will not publish technical details that could help attackers.[1] The Journal’s note on [the US$6.3bn Binance theft](https://www.thetechbag.com/blog/binance-hot-wallet-theft-stablecoin-freeze) covers the other end of crypto custody: keys held online by an exchange.

How we did this

Figures as of 16 November 2026, 11:30pm IST

The three devices, the purchase dates and channels, the 48 buyers, the 80% cut, the firmware and the description of the implant are from Trezor’s update of 12 November; the first report, CryptoBilis’s former status and the 9 October removal are from its notice of 30 October. Trezor describes CryptoBilis only as a reseller “in Southeast Asia” and the first reporter as a customer in Indonesia; we do not name a country for the reseller. Neither company names who fitted the implants, and we do not. Ledger’s account is from its own statement of 15 October. Trezor’s public firmware changelog lists 2.13.1 under a later date and does not describe the protection; we use Trezor’s statement that it was released on 11 November. “7 weeks” is our arithmetic, 23 September to 12 November.

Spotted an error? Write to us; corrections are published at the foot of the piece.

Sources

1. [Trezor, Our CryptoBilis investigation: what we found and what we’ve changed](https://trezor.io/blog/news/our-cryptobilis-investigation-what-we-found-and-what-weve-changed) — 12 November 2026
2. [Trezor, Implant reported in a Trezor sold by CryptoBilis](https://trezor.io/blog/news/implant-reported-in-a-trezor-sold-by-cryptobilis) — 30 October 2026
3. [Ledger, Ledger’s Response to the Hardware Implant Attack](https://www.ledger.com/blog-response-hardware-implant-attack) — 15 October 2026
4. [Trezor, Authenticate Trezor Safe 5 (setup guide)](https://trezor.io/learn/a/authenticate-trezor-safe-5) — undated page

**Disclosure.** TechBag is a software reseller: it earns when companies buy through it, including from vendors named here. The analysis is TechBag’s own; no vendor paid for or saw this piece before publication. Facts are labelled reported, TechBag count or our view.

Go deeper on TechBag

- [Binance lost $6.3 billion in 20 minutes; Tether and Circle froze $1.8 billion in an hour](https://www.thetechbag.com/blog/binance-hot-wallet-theft-stablecoin-freeze) — the other end of crypto custody: keys an exchange holds online
- [Valid provenance, malicious code: what three npm worm waves broke](https://www.thetechbag.com/blog/npm-worm-valid-provenance-supply-chain) — a software supply chain attacked through its distribution, not its maker
- [Endpoint protection guide](https://www.thetechbag.com/browse/security/endpoint-protection) — the controls on the devices an organisation hands out
