Identity & accessAnalysis
How a year of SaaS data thefts worked: voice calls, approved apps and stolen integration tokens, mid-2025 to 13 July 2026, from Microsoft, Google and the FBI.
On 13 July 2026 Microsoft published a year of intrusions into Salesforce tenants, mid-2025 to mid-2026, by actors with “overlapping tradecraft commonly associated with ShinyHunters”, and named retail, education and manufacturing among the sectors hit.1 If your company runs Salesforce, HubSpot, Zoho CRM or Microsoft 365, the same mechanism applies to you: an employee can connect a third-party app, and the app then reads data on its own. So the questions are practical. Who in your company can say yes to an app? Would anyone notice if they said yes during a phone call? And which of your vendors holds a standing key to your customer records?
The FBI dates the voice campaign, which Google tracks as UNC6040, to October 2024. The callers phone a company’s call centre or staff posing as IT support, often about a connectivity problem or “an auto-generated ticket”.3 Google says the group favours the English-speaking branches of multinationals.2 What follows is a sequence of ordinary-looking steps, and only the last one is visibly criminal.
Every step of the call happens on a real login page; the attacker never needs a software flaw
The UNC6040 voice-phishing sequence against Salesforce, as described by the FBI and Google, October 2024 to September 2025
Step 1 of 6
1. The call
A caller posing as IT support says a ticket needs closing or a connection needs fixing, and stays on the line.
Source: FBI FLASH-20250912-001 (12 September 2025); Google Threat Intelligence Group, 5 June 2025 · as of 12 September 2025
“Beat MFA” needs a precise meaning. In step 3 the victim is already signed in; multi-factor authentication has proved who they are, and never asks whether they should hand a key to a stranger’s app. Only step 2, a code read out over the phone, is something MFA could stop, and only a phishing-resistant kind.
OAuth is how one app gets permission to use another on your behalf without ever seeing your password. Think of a valet key: it starts the car but does not open the boot, and the owner hands it over once. Salesforce calls these permitted apps “connected apps”; an administrator or a sufficiently privileged user approves them.3 The weakness is in the hand-over, not the key.
Once a person approves an app, the app holds its own key and no longer needs that person, their password or their MFA
How OAuth app consent works in Salesforce, Microsoft 365 and similar SaaS platforms, as documented to July 2026
An app asks
It names what it wants: read contacts, run queries, or “full” access.
A person says yes
A signed-in user or admin approves on the platform’s real page, so nothing looks fake.
The platform issues a token
The app, not the person, now holds an access token and usually a refresh token.
The app works alone
It calls the API as that user. A password reset does not end it, and sign-ins may show nothing odd.
Source: FBI FLASH-20250912-001; Microsoft Entra documentation on user consent; Microsoft Security blog, 13 July 2026 · as of 13 July 2026
Microsoft saw exactly that last step: discovery, bulk queries and mass exfiltration of accounts, contacts and service cases, “often without sign-in anomalies.”1 Most buyers have never looked at who is allowed to approve. In Microsoft Entra, by default, “all users are allowed to consent to applications for permissions that don’t require administrator consent”; Microsoft’s own advice is to allow user consent only for apps from verified publishers.6 In Salesforce, Google’s advice is to keep the “Manage Connected Apps” and “Customize Application” permissions with trusted admins, and to treat “API Enabled”, which “allows broad data export capabilities”, as a privilege.2
The phone call needs a gullible employee. The other route needs only a vendor that has already been connected. Between 8 and 18 August 2025 an actor Google tracks as UNC6395 used stolen Salesloft Drift tokens to export Cases, Accounts, Users and Opportunities from “numerous corporate Salesforce instances”, then searched the haul for AWS keys, passwords and Snowflake tokens.4 Salesloft and Salesforce revoked every Drift token on 20 August.3 In November Salesforce revoked the tokens of Gainsight-published apps; Gainsight said it had been breached through tokens linked to Drift.5 One theft fed the next.
Each integration breach opened a new set of customer tenants, and one led to the next
Disclosures and token revocations in the Salesforce data-theft campaigns, June 2025 to July 2026
| Date | Event | Detail |
|---|---|---|
| 5 Jun 2025 | Google describes the voice campaign | UNC6040: fake Data Loader approved during IT-support calls |
| 8 Aug 2025 | Drift tokens used | Exports from many Salesforce instances, 8 to 18 August |
| 20 Aug 2025 | All Drift tokens revoked | Salesloft and Salesforce; Drift pulled from AppExchange |
| 12 Sept 2025 | FBI FLASH | Indicators for UNC6040 and UNC6395 |
| 20 Nov 2025 | Gainsight tokens revoked | Gainsight says it was breached via Drift-linked tokens |
| 12 Mar 2026 | Telus Digital confirms a breach | Attackers claim cloud keys found in Drift-stolen data |
| 11 Jun 2026 | Klue-linked activity | Microsoft's indicator date; Salesforce then disables Klue Battlecards |
| 13 Jul 2026 | Microsoft's write-up | A year of intrusions and the defences |
Source: Google GTIG; FBI; BleepingComputer; Microsoft Security blog · as of 13 July 2026 · Dates are of the activity or the disclosure as each source gives it. Telus Digital's entry route is the attackers' claim.
The latest link is Klue, a competitive-intelligence tool. Klue told customers that attackers got into its backend through “a dormant but still active credential created by Klue for a prototype integration” and pushed a code update that stole customers’ OAuth tokens. Huntress confirmed its Salesforce data was taken; Salesforce disabled the Klue Battlecards app; Klue switched off its HubSpot, SharePoint, Zoom, Gong, Chorus, Clari, Google Drive and Slack integrations too.8 Attribution is contested: Microsoft names the actor that got into Klue Storm-3138,1 and BleepingComputer ties the extortion emails to a newer group called “Icarus”, not ShinyHunters.8 For the buyer it makes no difference. Verizon’s 2026 breach report puts a third party in 48% of breaches.9
Extortion groups sell on the size of their claims, so the numbers below are in two columns. Google disclosed that its own corporate Salesforce instance was hit in June 2025 by similar activity, losing “basic and largely publicly available business information.”2 The largest 2026 case is Charter Communications: ShinyHunters says it phoned a Charter employee on 1 April, took over their Microsoft Entra account and exported customer records from Salesforce.10
The attackers' numbers run far ahead of anything a victim or an independent counter has confirmed
Victims of the Salesforce data-theft campaigns: confirmed or independently reported, against attacker claims, August 2025 to June 2026
Confirmed or independently reported
Claimed by the attackers, not verified
Source: Google GTIG; BleepingComputer (Gainsight, Telus Digital, Charter, Klue); Have I Been Pwned via BleepingComputer · as of 30 June 2026 · Claims are the attackers' own and were not verified by the reporters. Records and accounts are different units.
Have I Been Pwned counted 4.9 million accounts in the data leaked after Charter refused to pay; Charter said only “sales tools used to manage current, past and prospective Business customers were impacted.”11 At Instructure, the company behind the Canvas learning platform, BleepingComputer reports several attacks, Canvas outages, data on tens of millions of students, and an “agreement” with the group.10 The right-hand column was told to BleepingComputer by the attackers; none of it has been confirmed by Salesforce or the companies named.57
This activity was not the result of a vulnerability inherent to Salesforce.
Microsoft’s defences are specific.1 Its first is to connect Salesforce to Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps, which is its own product; read that as one way to do the job, not the only one. Every other step can be done with Salesforce’s own controls, and we have put them in the order we would do them.
Most of the defences are settings and procedures you already own; the deep logging is a paid add-on
Defences against OAuth app abuse in Salesforce, from Microsoft (13 July 2026), Google GTIG (2025) and the FBI (September 2025)
Step 1 of 6
1. List every connected app
Find the highly privileged ones and check each integration is one you chose.
Source: Microsoft Security blog, 13 July 2026; Google GTIG, 5 June and 27 August 2025; FBI FLASH-20250912-001 · as of 13 July 2026 · Salesforce Shield Event Monitoring is a paid add-on; Microsoft's alternative is Defender for Cloud Apps.
Steps 1 to 5 come from Microsoft and Google.124 Step 6 is the FBI’s.3 After any vendor breach, add a seventh: revoke and rotate every key, credential and token that integration held, as Google advised Drift customers.4
Sources
Disclosure. TechBag is a software reseller: it earns a margin when a reader buys through it, including from vendors named here. The analysis is TechBag’s own; no vendor paid for or saw this piece before publication. Facts are labelled reported, TechBag count or our view.